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Lawyers and Cocaine: The Legal
Profession Draws the Line
Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws
. . . argues recreancy to his position and office ... 
I. Introduction
The legal profession distinguishes itself from other professions
by obligating its members to maintain the highest degree of ethical
and legal conduct.' Occasionally, however, lawyers, incapacitated be-
cause of an addiction to drugs, repudiate the oaths they have under-
taken to uphold the law.' Because lawyers are subject to life's
human frailties, they are not immune from the ravages of illegal
drug activity." Throughout the United States, there are incidences of
lawyers using and in many instances dealing,5 a variety of illegal
drugs.6 In recent years, convictions for cocaine offenses have
emerged as a principle source of an increasing number of lawyer dis-
ciplinary actions.' The illegality associated with cocaine creates
1. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1883).
2.
The attorney and counselor being, by the solemn judicial act of the court,
clothed with his office, does not hold it as a matter of grace and favor . . . [T]he
right which it confers upon him . . . is a right of which he can only be deprived
. . . for moral or professional delinquency.
Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 379 (1866).
3. Courts across the nation have addressed an overwhelming number of criminal and
disciplinary actions due to lawyers' drug related activities. For disciplinary actions based on
cocaine convictions, see In re Preston, 616 undercover agent); Disciplinary Board of the Ha-
waii Supreme Court v. Bergan, 60 Haw. 546, 592 P.2d 814 (1979) (possession with intent to
distribute cocaine); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Bensabat, 378 So. 2d 380 (La. 1979) (con-
spiracy to import cocaine into the United States); State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Matt,
213 Neb. 123, 327 N.W.2d 622 (1982) (serving as conduit for a friend's purchase of two
ounces of cocaine); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 510 Pa. 312, 507 A.2d 1215
(1986) (willful and knowing conspiracy to possess, import, and distribute cocaine); In re Disci-
pline of Reutter, 379 N.W.2d 315 (S.D. 1985) (aiding and abetting distribution of cocaine).
4. Dickason, Lawyers Assist Lawyers, 69 ILL. B.J. 546, 546 (1981) [hereinafter
Lawyers].
5. "Prosecutors across the country are reporting that attorneys charged with dealing
drugs are being investigated, indicted and convicted in scores of major and minor cases." Fla-
herty, Drugs: Crisis for the Bar?, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 8, 1983, at I [hereinafter Drugs].
6. Id.
7. Statistics Regarding Convictions for Narcotics Offenses, Disciplinary Board of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Oct. 13, 1987 (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office).
Once a lawyer has been convicted of an offense involving cocaine, a controlled substance, disci-
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unique issues that transgress social, ethical and legal bounds.
Illegal drug activity by lawyers creates a special burden upon
the legal profession.8 The legal profession is relatively autonomous
and carries with it a special responsibility of self-government.9 Ulti-
mate authority over the legal profession is vested in the courts, and,
as a result, the courts have promulgated guidelines providing stan-
dards by which to judge the transgressor.10 These guidelines define
the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to expect and
state the minimum conduct below which no lawyer can fall without
being subject to disciplinary action.11
In the past, lawyers in Pennsylvania were guided by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. 2 On October 16, 1987, however, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the Rules of Professional Con-
duct.13 The new Rules of Professional Conduct, which take effect on
April 1, 1988, considerably modify the standards applicable to law-
yers who engage in illegal drug activity.
This Comment explores the social, ethical, and legal issues con-
cerning the effect of cocaine within the legal profession. It includes a
discussion of the scope of the problem and the extent to which law-
yers, as a class, are found to be particularly vulnerable to cocaine
plinary proceedings immediately commence. PA. R.D.E. 214(d) (1987). This section in perti-
nent part provides:
(d) Upon the filing with the Supreme Court of a certified copy of an order
demonstrating that an attorney has been convicted of a crime which is punisha-
ble by imprisonment for one year or upward . . . . the Court may enter an order
immediately suspending the attorney . . . , pending final disposition of a disci-
plinary proceeding to be commenced upon such conviction.
Cocaine is classified as a Schedule 11 controlled substance. E.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1982).
8. As officers of the court, lawyers act as guardians of the law. When an attorney vio-
lates the law, that violation must be regulated by the judiciary to preserve the judiciary as a
working part of the system of checks and balances. See generally, Weber, "Still in Good
Standing": The Crisis in Attorney Discipline, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1, 1987, at 58, 63 [hereinafter
Discipline].
9. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (1981); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1983).
10. Previously, some version of the American Bar Association's Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility had been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions in the United States.
Presently, however, twenty-four states have adopted the Rules of Professional Conduct pat-
terned after the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Maher, Pa.
Adopts New Rules of Conduct, PA. L.J. REP., Nov. 2, 1987, at 1. For a continuous update on
the number of states that have adopted some version of the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct, contact the A.B.A. Center for Professional Responsibility in Chicago, Illinois.
It. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1981).
12. In its order of February 27, 1974, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania amended
Rule 205 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure to implement the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Code of Professional Responsibility as the standard of conduct for attorneys of all the
courts of the Commonwealth. PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Definitions (1987).
13. PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1988).
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abuse. An analysis of current case law under the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility, in comparison with the newly adopted Rules of
Professional Conduct, will provide a view of Pennsylvania's judicial
response to two relevant ethical provisions: the misconduct provision
and the reporting provision. The final discussion concerns the poten-
tial conflict between the lawyer's obligation to report the misconduct
of fellow practitioners and the implementation of Pennsylvania's im-
paired-lawyer program. Lastly, the Comment suggests that an ex-
ception to the Rules of Professional Conduct is required in order to
exclude members of the impaired-lawyer program from the obliga-
tions imposed by the reporting provision.
II. The Scope of the Problem
I did it because of the intrigue. I did it for the escape. I did
it to see if I had the guts to do something that was inherently
dangerous.14
A. The Epidemic
The United States is witnessing an epidemic of drug abuse, and
cocaine abuse lies at the core of the problem.15 Statistics show that
the use of cocaine is increasing at an astonishing rate. 6 Approxi-
mately 20 million Americans report that they have used cocaine at
least once, 17 and nearly every day the media reports on some aspect
of this pervasive problem.' 8
14. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 510 Pa. 312, 507 A.2d 1215 (1986). The
quotation provided by Roger Simon during his disciplinary proceeding before the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court is representative of the reasons many lawyers proffer for their involvement
with cocaine.
15. Drug abuse in America has been called an "epidemic as pervasive and as dangerous
in its way as the plagues of medieval times." Smith, The Drug Crisis, NEWSWEEK, June 16,
1986 at 15. See also, Fighting the Cocaine Wars, TIME, Feb. 25, 1985 at 26; The Evil Empire,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1985 at 14.
16. As of June 1986 the number of admissions into Pennsylvania hospitals for cocaine
abuse was 4,839. Cocaine and Crack Fact Sheet: Statistics of Cocaine Use, (information com-
piled by the Pennsylvania Bar Association on file in the Dickinson Law Review office) [herein-
after Statistics]. In New York, the number of cocaine related emergency room episodes in-
creased from 771 in 1979 to 1999 in 1980. W. STONE, M. FROMME, D. KAGEN, COCAINE:
SEDUCTION AND SOLUTION 3 (1984). Nationally, cocaine related deaths increased 200 percent
during the same period. Id. Statistics from the National Center for Disease Control showed a
quadrupling of cocaine related deaths between 1976 and 1981. Caffey, Counter-Attack on
Cocaine: The Strategy of Enforcement, DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Fall 1982, at 2.
17. See Statistics, supra note 17; see also M. GOLD, 800-COCAINE 1 (1986) [hereinafter
800-COCAINE]; N. STONE, M. FROMME, D. KAGEN, supra note 17.
18. See, e.g., America on Drugs, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 28, 1986, at 48; War
on Drugs, The Harrisburg (Pa.) Patriot, Sept. 17, 1986, at Al; Morganthau, Crack and
Crime, NEWSWEEK, June 16, 1986, at 16; Anti-Cocaine Campaign, PA. B. A. News Release,
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The dimensions of the problem are not confined to any one eco-
nomic or social class.19 Because no segment of society is immune
from the epidemic, the legal profession is currently facing a major
crisis.2" Users and dealers of cocaine may be found in every area of
practice, and in every segment of the bar.2" Young lawyers, fresh out
of law school, are the most likely candidates among the profession to
succumb to the lures of cocaine. Thus, the typical cocaine user is
generally described as a professional, between the ages of twenty and
thirty, who is on the way up and is just beginning to feel the attrib-
utes of success. 2
B. The Reasons
An examination of the reasons why lawyers use cocaine provides
a basis for understanding the overall problem. A lawyer's attraction
to cocaine may stem from either the belief that cocaine is non-addic-
tive and harmless if used only occasionally23 or from the belief that
cocaine maintains a highly respected status as the drug of choice
among the "well to do. '"2 4 Cocaine is often seductively portrayed as a
status drug; therefore, zealous new lawyers may seek to indulge in
March 24, 1987.
19. Wise, Alcohol and Drug Abuse, L.A. LAW., March 1986, at 6.
20. See Drugs, supra note 5, at 1.
21. See, e.g., Kaplan, Federal Prosecutor Federal Prisoner, NAT'L. L.J., Dec. 8, 1986, at
31 (federal narcotics prosecutor was convicted after stealing 845-gram cocaine exhibit from
the U.S. Attorney's evidence safe; Drug Charges, PA. L.J. REP., Sept. 21, 1987, at 9 (city
solicitor took leave of absence after charges of distributing multiple fractional ounce quantities
of cocaine); Terpening, Lawyer Convicted; Was He Victim?, NAT'L. L.J., Aug. 20, 1984, at 3
(prominent North Carolina defense attorney conspired to distribute cocaine but claimed to be
victim of F.B.I. plot); Kelley, Zimmerman Aide Quits Over Drug Allegation, The Harrisburg
(Pa.) Patriot, Sept. 19, 1986, at I (top aid to Pennsylvania Attorney General resigned amid
allegations that he was heavy cocaine user); U.P.I., April 3, 1987 (available on NEXIS, Omni
library, Wires file) (three New Jersey judicial clerks publicly reprimanded for dishonoring
their coveted positions by using cocaine); U.P.I., July 7, 1983 (available on NEXIS, Omni li-
brary, Wires file) (search of Arizona attorney's tote bag revealed marijuana and cocaine);
Sheehan and Lee, O'Leary Faces Heroin-Buying Charges, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Oct. 3,
1987, at I (Pennsylvania councilman and mayoral hopeful arrested and charged with attempt-
ing to procure heroin at street corner notorious for drug trafficking).
22. 800-COCAINE, supra note 17 at 1; see also N. STONE, M. FROMME, D. KAGAN, supra
note 17.
23. Langer, Preventing Cocaine Abuse, DRUG ENFORCEMENT, Fall 1982, at 27. Some
experts believe that cocaine is non-addictive because terminating its use does not result in
physical withdrawal. The majority of experts, however, agree that, with large enough doses, a
cocaine user will develope a tolerance and will experience withdrawal symptoms such as de-
pression, anger, and paranoia when use is terminated. See, 800-COCAINE, supra note 17, at 15;
see also, Cocaine in the Legal Profession, 73 ILL. B.J. 50 (1984) [hereinafter Legal
Profession].
24. "The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee Report for 1980 veri-
fies the 'status drug' classification of cocaine." Langer, Preventing Cocaine Abuse, DRUG EN-
FORCEMENT, Fall 1982, at 28.
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the vices of cocaine to symbolize their rank among the "privileged
few.,"25
Lawyers as a class may be particularly susceptible to the abuse
of cocaine.2 6 Although they are often perceived as rational and logi-
cal, many are fearful of revealing their emotions and are afraid to
acknowledge their vulnerability.27 Lawyers are also susceptible to
chemical dependency because of the lifestyle and work pressures
brought upon them by the nature of the profession. 28 The profession
often encourages lawyers to feel omnipotent and ostentatious. As a
result, they may possibly use cocaine to enhance their mental ability,
creativity, and self-esteem.29 Ambitious, affluent, and power-loving
lawyers have been found to be particularly attracted. 30 Although at-
torneys possessing such characteristics may be preoccupied with
achieving power and influence, they also may have insecurities."1
Consequently, they depend on cocaine to get them through high
pressure situations such as meetings, conferences, and courtroom
appearances.82
A lawyer under the influence of cocaine while in court is not
uncommon. 3 Cocaine provides a solution to anxiety accompanied
with a sense of power and control as the pressure to perform contin-
ues to mount.3" It is the type of drug that will make the lawyer feel
25. The use of cocaine is often considered to be "chic." It was once considered the
champagne of drugs and because of its exorbitant price (one half of a gram of cocaine could
cost anywhere between $75.00 and $100.00) only the rich could afford it. See Blodgett, Co-
caine Blues, A.B.A. J., May 1, 1986, at 25, 26 [hereinafter Cocaine Blues]. See also Matter of
Discipline of Strange, 366 N.W.2d 495, 496 (S.D. 1985) (where court concluded that the
defendant lawyers "became involved in a fast moving society which believed it was rather chic
to use cocaine socially").
26. "Where doctors are at risk for drug addiction because of self-prescribing, lawyers
may be susceptible because of the very qualities they bring to the profession." Moss, Out of
Control, PA. LAW., March 1987, at 16 [hereinafter Out of Control].
27. Id.
28. See Baker, Substance Abuse/Lawyers Are Not Immune to This Pervasive Social
Crisis, L.A. LAW., Feb. 1987, at 9 [hereinafter Substance Abuse].
29. See Cocaine Blues, supra note 25, at 25.
30. Id., see also In re Rentel, 107 Wash.2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986) (psychiatrist
testified that people with narcissistic personalities are considered to be more vulnerable to alco-
hol and drug abuse).
31. See Cocaine Blues, supra note 25.
32. Id. Lawyers want to go to court and present themselves well to the judge. Cocaine is
a natural high that will make the lawyer feel more positive for that moment. See Legal Profes-
sion, supra note 23, at 51.
33. Some lawyers who use drugs hold depositions and trials while under the influence.
The nation's courtrooms are not necessarily safe from the depredations of drug using lawyers.
See Drugs, supra note 5, at 9.
34. See generally Cocaine Blues, supra note 25. "An attorney once addicted to cocaine
found it 'complementary' to his practice. It did away with the fears and anxiety of trial work,
built up his self-confidence, boosted his energy and made him feel in control - at least in the
beginning." Out of Control, supra note 26, at 17.
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that he is everything he is expected to be: eloquent, powerful, and
secure.35 In contrast, it is also the type of drug that, with increased
consumption, causes paranoia86  and compulsiveness. 37 Therefore,
when the lawyer realizes that he can no longer perform at an accel-
erated level without using the drug, the emotional quicksand of ad-
diction sets in.38
C. The Consequences
If a lawyer is addicted to cocaine, the signs of abuse will eventu-
ally become apparent. An addicted lawyer will experience all the
same symptoms that non-lawyer addicts experience.5 9 Likewise, the
signs of addiction may surface in the lawyer's practice."0 Often the
addicted lawyer will experience financial difficulties and will be una-
ble to support his addiction.4 ' As a result, there may be an increased
temptation for lawyers to commit crimes involving financial dishon-
esty, such as embezzling funds from a partner or commingling funds
from a client.4 Furthermore, it is not unusual for an addicted lawyer
35. See Cocaine Blues, supra note 25, at 25.
36. 800-COCAINE, supra note 17, at 38. People who use large doses of cocaine over a
long period of time may become paranoid or experience "cocaine psychosis" which causes
hallucinations. Legal Profession, supra note 23, at 51.
37. According to psychologists, the psychological compulsion to continue using cocaine is
enormous. Nationally, of the people who present themselves for treatment, only 15 to 17% stay
off cocaine for more than a year. See Cocaine Blues, supra note 25, at 26.
38. Psychologist and drug therapist Edward C. Hendrickson has noted that lawyers as a
group seem to have a specific physiological and psychological reaction to mood-altering chemi-
cals. Kaplan, Federal Prosecutor Federal Prisoner, Nat'l L.J. Dec. 8, 1986 at 32, 34.
39. Symptoms of cocaine abuse include restlessness, hyperactivity, extreme verbosity,
irritability, testiness, mood swings, anxiety, paranoia, weight loss, frequent sniffing or nose
rubbing, or financial problems. See Cocaine Blues, supra note 25, at 26; see also, Legal Pro-
fession, supra note 23, at 51.
40. If the lawyer is addicted to cocaine the odds are overwhelming that his professional
performance will be affected by at least one of the following: (1) ineffective advocacy, (2)
misappropriation or commingling of client's funds, (3) embezzlement from partners, (4) errors
of judgment, (5) erratic work hours, (6) excessive absenteeism or (7) missed court appear-
ances. See generally Drugs, supra note 5, at 10. See also Substance Abuse, supra note 28.
41. The estimated expenditure necessary to support an addiction to cocaine can exceed
thousands of dollars a week. See generally, Drugs, supra note 5, at 10; see also Matter of
McCarthy, 466 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. 1984) (attorney's addiction to cocaine cost him $2,000 a
week).
42. See, e.g., In re Vaughn, 38 Cal.3d 614, 698 P.2d 651, 213 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1985)
(attorney disbarred for repeatedly converting his client's money to supply his cocaine habit);
People v. Fitzke, 716 P.2d 1065 (Colo. 1986) (court found that disbarment was not unjust
discipline for embezzlement of funds from estate of client, conversion of money belonging to
employer, and convictions of theft and unlawful distribution of cocaine); Matter of Kaufman,
104 N.J. 509, 518 A.2d 185 (1986) (attorney's need for funds to feed his drug habit led him to
misappropriate his client's funds); In re Anonymous ("Anonymous One"), 38 Pa. D. & C. 3d
517 (1984) (attorney disbarred for converting a portion of client's settlement proceeds to sus-
tain his drug addiction); In re Rentel, 107 Wash. 2d 276, 729 P.2d 615 (1986) (court held that
misappropriation of funds while addicted to cocaine warrants disbarment).
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to begin bartering legal services in exchange for drugs.4" Interest-
ingly, some lawyers initially encounter cocaine through representing
their clients.44
Drug abuse has been estimated to effect one out of every ten
lawyers. 5 Consequently, because of the professional problems associ-
ated with drug use, an increasing number of lawyers are being sanc-
tioned by disciplinary boards across the country. Forty to sixty per-
cent of the total number of lawyers in the United States who have
appeared before disciplinary boards have been estimated to have
drug abuse problems." The number of disciplinary proceedings in
Pennsylvania resulting from lawyers convictions for cocaine offenses
has tripled from 1986 to 1987. 41
II. The Judicial Response
Lawyers face unique ethical issues when their peers engage in
illegal drug activity."' The American Bar Association's Model Code
of Professional Responsibility and Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct provide the governing standards for bar discipline in most juris-
dictions."" On April 1, 1988, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court will
begin to regulate its lawyers conduct according to Pennsylvania's
newly adopted Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules). Previously,
lawyers in Pennsylvania had been guided by the Code of Professional
Responsibility (Code). Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has yet to decide a disciplinary action based on a lawyer's cocaine-
related conduct under the Rules, a comparison of the disciplinary
actions adopted in the Code with the actions outlined in the Rules
will provide insight into the potential changes and effects the Rules
may have on this issue. Two provisions applicable to this inquiry are
43. See, e.g., Columbus Bar Ass'n v. Cockrum, 21 Ohio St.3d 51, 487 N.E.2d 314
(1986) (attorney received one year suspension for accepting cocaine and marijuana in lieu of
payment for legal services).
44. See Matter of Goldberg, 105 N.J. 278, 520 A.2d 1147 (1987); Matter of Mintz, 101
N.J. 527, 503 A.2d 290 (1986); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 510 Pa. 312, 507
A.2d 1215 (1986). "Some prosecutors and other lawyers believe that attorneys who specialize
in drug related defense work are particularly susceptible both to involvement in the narcotics
market and to drug use." See Drugs, supra note 5, at 9.
45. See Lawyers, supra note 4, at 546.
46. See Cocaine Blues, supra note 25, at 25. "Lawyers close to the problem estimate
that more than half of the misconduct charges leveled against attorneys arise from either
drugs or alcohol." Drugs, supra note 5, at 8.
47. Statistics regarding Convictions for Narcotics Offenses, Disciplinary Board of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Oct. 13, 1987 (copy on file in the Dickinson Law Review office).
48. See Drugs, supra note 5, at 10.
49. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1981); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (1983).
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the rules regulating misconduct 50 and the rules obligating lawyers to
report the misconduct of their fellow lawyers."
A. Misconduct - The Disciplined Scope of Professional Conduct
Any violation of the ethical and professional conduct standards
of the Pennsylvania Code or Rules constitutes grounds for discipli-
nary intervention;5 2 the nature of disciplinary proceedings in Penn-
50. PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 1-102 (1987)
provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not
(1) Violate a Disciplinary Rule
(2) Circumvent a Disciplinary Rule through actions of another.
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law.
PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1988) in pertinent part provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice ....
51. PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 1-103 (1987)
provides:
(A) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a violation of DR 1-102
shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to inves-
tigate or act upon such violation.
(B) A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge or evidence concerning an-
other lawyer or a judge shall reveal fully such knowledge or evidence upon
proper request of a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act
upon the conduct of lawyers or judges.
PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 (1988) provides:
(a) A lawyer having knowledge that another lawyer has committed a viola-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,
shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
52. To implement and enforce the Code's standards the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
promulgated the Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement. PA. R.D.E. 203 (1987) in pertinent part
provides:
Rule 203 Grounds for Discipline
(a) Acts or omissions by a person subject to these rules . . . which violate
the Disciplinary Rules, shall constitute misconduct and shall be grounds for dis-
cipline whether or not the act or omission occurred in the course of an attorney
client relationship.
(b) The following shall also be grounds for discipline:
(1) Conviction of a crime which under Enforcement Rule 214 (relat-
ing to attorneys convicted of crimes) may result in suspension.
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sylvania is neither civil nor criminal.53 Moreover, the authority of
the supreme court to supervise and discipline a lawyer under the
Code has not been limited to those situations in which a lawyer is
acting in a professional capacity.54 Violations of the Code for con-
duct involving cocaine may be grounds for discipline regardless of
when or where the conduct occurs.5 Whether the same result will be
warranted under the Rules remains an open question.5 6
The relevant legal inquiry under both the Code and the Rules is
to determine whether the lawyer's misconduct has rendered him un-
fit to practice law, and neither the Rules nor the Code require a
determination of the factual implications concerning a violation.57
This is consistent with the traditional rationale for disciplinary pro-
ceedings which is not to punish, but to insure that the public, the
courts, and the profession are protected against unsuitable legal
practitioners.58 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the
primary purpose of the disciplinary system is to "determine the fit-
ness of an attorney to continue the practice of law."59
A lawyer's criminal conviction in Pennsylvania will automati-
cally constitute a basis for the imposition of discipline. 60 If a lawyer
is convicted of a cocaine-related offense, the disciplinary sanction
that may be imposed can range from private informal admonition by
the Disciplinary Board61 to disbarment by the court.62
53. In re Leopold, 469 Pa. 384, 366 A.2d 227 (1976).
54. PA. R.D.E. 203(a) (1987); see also American Bar Association Formal Opinion 336
(June 3, 1974) (requiring lawyers to comply with the applicable rules at all times).
55. The majority of states that have adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsi-
bility's moral turpitude standard apply the standard without regard to whether the misconduct
in question has a bearing on professional capacity. A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY by State. Canon I at 4 (1977).
56. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
57. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 375 A.2d 616 (1975).
58. See In re Kreamer, 14 Cal.3d 524, 532, 535 P.2d 728, 733, 121 Cal. Rptr. 600, 605
(1975); see also Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Bensabat, 373 So.2d 380, 382 (La. 1979); State
ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Denton, 598 P.2d 663, 665 (Okla. 1979). Under this frame-
work, personal activities that might subject the profession to public "derusion or distrust" are
appropriate grounds for disciplinary intervention. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional
Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491 (1985).
59. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Lucarini, 504 Pa. 271, 281, 472 A.2d 186, 190
(1983).
60. See supra note 7.
61. The Disciplinary Board of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exists pursuant to the
Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement and is authorized to investigate conduct of attorneys sub-
ject to the Supreme Court's discipline. After a hearing committee conducts hearings into an
attorney's conduct, it makes recommendations as to the disposition of the charges. The full
Board is required to review those recommendations and make final recommendations to the
court. PA. R.D.E. 205, 206 and 208 (1987).
62. PA.R.D.E. 204(a) (1987) provides:
(a) Misconduct shall be grounds for:
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1. Criminal Convictions.-The first ground upon which law-
yers may be disciplined for cocaine-related activities is when they
have been criminally convicted for their misconduct. In Pennsylva-
nia, the Code's "moral turpitude" standard was a controlling factor
in determining whether a lawyer's conviction for a cocaine offense
would constitute misconduct warranting disbarment or other discipli-
nary action. 63 Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3) of the Code provides
that a lawyer "shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral
turpitude." 64
The term "moral turpitude" has been used in the law for centu-
ries.65 It evolved as a response to the narrow criterion that existed at
common law for evaluating the morality of lawyers.66 The purpose of
the moral turpitude standard was to provide a less tenuous classifica-
tion for moral conduct,6 7 but, in reality, it is too broad and ambigu-
ous.68 Consequently, such ambiguity is evidenced by the wide-rang-
ing interpretation the moral turpitude standard has been given by
the courts.69
(1) Disbarment by the Supreme Court.
(2) Suspension by the Supreme Court for a period not exceeding five
years.
(3) Public censure by the Supreme Court with or without probation.
(4) Probation by the Supreme Court under supervision provided by
the Board.
(5) Private reprimand by the Board with or without probation.
(6) Private informal admonition by the Disciplinary Counsel.
For two divergent disciplinary responses, see Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 510 Pa.
312, 507 A.2d 1215 (1986) (facilitating the sale and purchase of cocaine warranted disbar-
ment) and In re Anonymous ("Anonymous Two"), 35 Pa. D. & C. 3d 160 (1984) (lawyer's
personal involvement in collection of money generated from cocaine sales warranted public
censure).
63. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 510 Pa. 312, 507 A.2d 1215 (1986). The
majority of courts that apply the moral turpitude standard have held that a lawyer's conviction
of a narcotics offense constitutes a crime of moral turpitude. See, e.g., Annotation, Narcotics
Conviction as Crime of Moral Turpitude Justifying Disbarment or Other Disciplinary Action
Against Attorney, 99 A.L.R. 3d 288 (1979).
64. See Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3), supra note 50.
65. See Note, Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, 43 HARV. L. REV. 117, 118 (1929)
[hereinafter Note]. See also 58 C.J.S. Morals, at 1201 (1948).
66. At common law, standards for morality were couched in terms of felony and misde-
meanor and crimes mala in se and maia prohibita. See Note, supra note 65, at 118.
67. Id.
68. "Moral turpitude is admittedly an elusive concept incapable of precise definition."
State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Denton, 598 P.2d 663, 665 (Okla. 1979). Many commen-
tators are critical of the Code's moral turpitude standard and argue for a narrower and less
ambiguous standard that is more closely related to a lawyer's fitness to practice law. See, e.g.,
Selinger & Schoen, "To Purify the Bar": A Constitutional Approach to Non-Professional
Misconduct, 5 NAT. RESOURCES J. 299, 351-52 (1965); Comment, Disciplining Attorneys for
Non-Professional Conduct Involving Alcohol and Sex, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 431.
69. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY 14-15, 19-21 (1979).
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The first publicly reported Pennsylvania case to address a law-
yer's conviction for a cocaine offense was Office of Disciplinary
Counsel v. Simon.70 The respondent-lawyer in Simon acted as a
middle man for the sale and purchase of four ounces of cocaine,
knew and acquiesced in allowing one-half ounce of cocaine to be sold
on the streets, and refused to tell the authorities the identity of the
ultimate purchaser of the cocaine.7 Following Simon's conviction on
federal drug charges, he was charged with misconduct under Disci-
plinary Rule 1-102 of the Code.7" The Disciplinary Board recom-
mended that Simon be suspended upon completion of his federal pro-
bation.73 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, issued a rule to
show cause why disbarment was not warranted.
74
The court examined the applicable ethical considerations set
forth in the Code and found that Simon's intentional participation in
a conspiracy to distribute cocaine was in total disregard of each of
those considerations. 75 The court then addressed the issue of whether
Simon's conduct involved moral turpitude. 76 The court defined moral
turpitude as "anything done knowingly contrary to justice, honesty,
principle or good morals. 77 In determining whether the crime in-
volved moral turpitude,78 the court looked to the elements and nature
of the crime itself7" instead of examining the facts and circumstances
70. 510 Pa. 312, 507 A.2d 1215 (1986).
71. Id. at 313-14, 507 A.2d at 1216.
72. Id. at 315, 507 A.2d at 1217. A three member hearing committee originally found
that Simon's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(5) which relates to conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice. The court, however, additionally found that the conduct involved
moral turpitude, DR 1-102(A)(3) and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law, DR 1-
102(A)(6). The court noted that, "although there is, in the broadest sense, dishonesty involved
in every crime," the lawyer's conduct in this case did not involve dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation. Id. at 320 n.7, 507 A.2d at 1219 n.7.
73. Simon, 510 Pa. at 317, 507 A.2d at 1218.
74. Id.; see also PA. R.D.E. 208(e)(3) (1987).
75. The court looked to the following ethical considerations: "Maintaining the integrity
and improving the competence of the bar to meet the highest ethical standards is the ethical
responsibility of every lawyer." PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-1 (1974).
"The public should be protected from those who are not qualified to be lawyers by reason of a
deficiency in education or moral standards . . . but who nevertheless seek to practice law." Id.
EC 1-2 (1974). A lawyer "should refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct.
Because of his position in society, even minor violations of the law ...tend to lessen public
confidence in the legal profession. Obedience to the law exemplifies respect for the law." Id.
EC 1-5 (1974). Simon, 510 Pa. at 319, 507 A.2d at 1219.
76. Simon, 510 Pa. at 320, 507 A.2d at 1219-20.
77. Id.; see also, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 910 (5th ed. 1979) which defined "moral
turpitude" as: "An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which
a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man."
78. Simon, 510 Pa. at 322, 507 A.2d at 1219-20.
79. For cases that consider the lawyers conduct based upon a fixed definition, see People
v. McGonigle, 198 Colo. 315, 600 P.2d 61 (1979) (criminal conduct involving sale of narcotic
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surrounding the commission of the crime.80 Since Simon freely ad-
mitted that he knew the cocaine transaction was "criminal" and "il-
legal," 1 the court followed the majority of courts and found such
misconduct to involve moral turpitude.82
Finding that the crime involved moral turpitude, the court then
examined the criminal charge and weighed the impact of the convic-
tion upon the measure of discipline to determine the appropriate dis-
ciplinary sanction to impose. The court found that Simon's conduct
presented two aggravating circumstances and provided no excuse,
justification, or mitigation to overcome the seriousness of the crime. a
The court determined that Simon had flouted the standards for at-
torneys practicing law and therefore deserved disbarment."
The scope of criminal conduct under the Rules, in contrast to
the scope of criminal conduct under the Code's standard of moral
turpitude, is distinctly narrower and more explicitly defined.85 Rule
drugs alone constitutes moral turpitude); Florida Bar v. Wilson, 425 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1983) (ille-
gal drug trafficking is a troublesome and serious crime involving moral turpitude); Cincinnati
Bar Ass'n v. Levin, 3 Ohio St.3d 2, 445 N.E.2d 661 (1983) (trafficking in drugs being a felony
in the third degree is clearly a non-petty offense involving moral turpitude); In re Chase, 299
Or. 388, 702 P.2d 1082 (1985) (conviction of attempted possession of cocaine which required
element of intent or knowledge is not conduct involving moral turpitude).
80. For cases that consider the circumstances of each case, see In re Scarnavack, 108
1ll.2d 456, 485 N.E.2d 1 (1985) (final determination of sanctions requires an analysis of
unique facts and circumstances of the particular case); In re Gorman, 269 Ind. 236, 379
N.E.2d 970 (1978) (issue for determination is the measure of lawyer's conduct viewed in toto
against his moral fitness to continue in the practice of law; the issue is not the nature of the
drug involved).
81. Simon, 510 Pa. at 320, 507 A.2d at 1218.
82. See, e.g., In re Gorman, 269 Ind. 236, 379 N.E.2d 970 (1978) (lawyer's conviction
of federal charges of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, distribution of cocaine, and
conspiracy to distribute cocaine involved moral turpitude); People v. McGonigle, 198 Colo.
315, 600 P.2d 61 (1979) (lawyer's conviction of felony for sale of narcotics and use of status to
accomplish illegal commercial transaction constituted misconduct involving moral turpitude);
Florida Bar v. Wilson, 425 So.2d 2 (Fla. 1983) (where lawyer convicted for soliciting to traffic
cocaine was found to engage in conduct involving moral turpitude); Disciplinary Board of the
Hawaii Supreme Court v. Bergan, 60 Haw. 546, 592 P.2 d814 (1979) (misconduct involving
moral turpitude for the possession with intent to distribute cocaine); State ex rel. Nebraska
State Bar Ass'n v. Matt, 213 Neb. 123, 327 N.W.2d 622 (1982) (conduct involving moral
turpitude when lawyer facilitated the use of cocaine between two of his acquaintances because
of friendship).
83. Simon, 510 Pa. at 322, 507 A.2d at 1220-21. A disciplinary proceeding inquires into
a lawyer's fitness to practice, not just into whether the alleged misconduct occurred, and,
therefore, matters not directly connected to the alleged misconduct are relevant in aggravation
or mitigation of the sanction to be imposed. See Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct,
A.B.A.-B.N.A. § 101:3101 (1987). Cumulative, multiple, continuing, and prior acts of miscon-
duct can result in increased sanctions. See, e.g., In re Stewart, 121 Ariz. 243, 589 P.2d 886
(1979); Florida Bar v. Baron, 392 So.2d 1318 (Fla. 1981). However; good character, reputa-
tion, community service, and lack of prior misconduct will generally mitigate the extent of
sanctions imposed. See, e.g., In re Preston, 616 P.2d I (Alaska 1980); In re Chapman, 69
Ill.2d 494, 372 N.E.2d 675 (1978).
84. Simon, 510 Pa. at 323, 507 A.2d at 1221.
85. Cf. PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3) and
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8.4(b) limits the conduct which would subject lawyers to professional
discipline to "criminal conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects."8 6
The Comment to Rule 8.4 explains that although a lawyer is person-
ally answerable to the entire criminal law, he should be profession-
ally answerable only for offenses that indicate a lack of those charac-
teristics relevant to the practice of law. 7 Thus, a lawyer who
engages in criminal conduct involving cocaine which does not affect
his capacity to practice law will not necessarily be subject to the
same disciplinary sanctions under the Rules. 8 The Rules' "fitness as
a lawyer" standard may permit even serious offenses involving co-
caine to go undisciplined, or it may warrant a less severe disciplinary
sanction if the offense does not involve a lawyer's practice of law or
affect his ability to practice law. "9
New Jersey is the only state which has applied some version of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to lawyers convicted of co-
caine-related offenses.9" The misconduct provision in the New Jersey
Rules of Professional Conduct is identical to the misconduct provi-
sion set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct.91
PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (1988), supra note 50.
86. See Rule 8.4(b) supra note 50.
87. PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 comment (1988).
88. Cf. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Simon, 510 Pa. 312, 507 A.2d 1215 (1986); In
re Kinnear, 105 N.J. 391, 522 A.2d 414 (1987).
89. See generally G. HAZARD AND W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK
ON THE MODERN RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 89, 565-66 (1985). If criminal conduct is
"wholly unrelated to the lawyer's professional life," professional discipline may not be war-
ranted. For a general discussion of the relevance of various kinds of criminal and non-criminal
acts to bar admission and attorney discipline. See Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional
Credential 94 YALE L.J. 491, 529-46, 551-62 (1985).
90. Matter of Kinnear, 105 N.J. 391, 522 A.2d 414 (1987) (lawyer's conviction for
cocaine violated Rule 8.4(b) warranting one year suspension); Matter of Goldberg, 105 N.J.
278, 520 A.2d 1147 (1987) (lawyer's conviction on charges of conspiracy to distribute and to
possess with intent to distribute cocaine violated Rule 8.4(b) warranting disbarment); Matter
of Orlando, 104 N.J. 344, 517 A.2d 139 (1986) (lawyer's acknowledged abuse of illegal drugs
adversely reflected on fitness to practice law warranting indefinite suspension until fitness is
again demonstrated).
91. Cf. Rule 8.4 supra note 50, and N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4
(1987) which provides:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
another;
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud deceit or
misrepresentation;
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice;
(e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government
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Therefore, application of the Rules by the New Jersey Supreme
Court may provide a basis for predicting how similar misconduct
would be treated under the Pennsylvania Rules.
In Matter of Kinnear,92 disciplinary proceedings were com-
menced following Kinnear's conviction for distributing cocaine to an
undercover narcotics investigator.98 The court found that Kinnear's
conduct violated the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
8.4(b) and concluded that his conduct warranted suspension from
the practice of law for one year.9 In reaching this decision, the court
looked at the totality of all the circumstances surrounding the
crime" and found that Kinnear's conviction established that he en-
gaged in illegal conduct that adversely reflected on his fitness to
practice law. 96 Yet, the court held that disbarment was not an ap-
propriate sanction where the conduct was unrelated to the practice
of law.
97
In finding that the less severe sanction of suspension was war-
ranted, the court considered the following factors: 1) that the law-
yer's conduct did not affect any client; 2) the conduct was not moti-
vated by an opportunity to profit from the transaction; 3) the
conduct did not involve the use of his position as a lawyer; and 4) the
conduct did not demonstrate a lack of fitness to be a lawyer. 8
2. Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit, or Misrepresentation.-Another
ground upon which lawyers may be disciplined for cocaine-related
activities is conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation. This general prohibition is contained in the misconduct
provision and overlaps with other sections of the Code and the Rules
that prohibit dishonesty or misrepresentation in specific contexts. 99
agency or official;
(f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct or other law.
92. 105 N.J. 391, 522 A.2d 414 (1987).
93. Kinnear pleaded guilty to a charge of distributing cocaine, was placed on probation
for three years, was fined $2,000, and was directed to continue outpatient treatment for his
addiction. Id. at 392-93, 522 A.2d at 415.
94. Id. at 396, 522 A.2d at 417.
95. The court stated:
In considering the appropriateness of the discipline we consider many fac-
tors: the nature and severity of the crime, whether the crime is directly related
to the practice of law, the respondent's good reputation, prior trustworthy pro-
fessional conduct and general good character.
Id. at 393, 522 A.2d at 415 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 396, 522 A.2d at 416-17.
97. Id. at 396, 522 A.2d at 417.
98. Id. at 396-97, 522 A.2d at 417.
99. Any criminal violation that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation
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There are two fact situations involving cocaine-related activities in
which a violation of this rule is likely to occur. The first is when a
lawyer deliberately misrepresents his ability to continue to practice
law.100 The second is when the lawyer's criminal conduct includes
the distribution of drugs or some form of conspiracy.10'
The Code's Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A)(4) provides that "a law-
yer shall not engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation." 0 2 In Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Casety,l0 a
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the respondent-lawyer's
indulgence in alcohol and drugs, coupled with his conviction for
homicide and his deliberate misrepresentation of his ability to con-
tinue in active practice, constituted a violation of this rule.'04 In
Casety, the respondent-lawyer was admitted to practice in Pennsyl-
vania, however, he was convicted of homicide in California and,
while undergoing rehabilitation for drug and alcohol dependencies,
he deliberately withheld from the Pennsylvania court the fact that he
had been convicted of a criminal offense.' 5 He also devised a
scheme to misrepresent his ability to continue to actively practice
law in Pennsylvania. 6
In determining that Casety's conduct warranted disbarment, the
court stated:
If lawyers are convicted of crimes which require discipline
and then are permitted to hide the fact from the courts and the
public, there is no question that the integrity of the bar would be
would also likely be a violation of PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary
Rule 1-102(A)(3), PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(b) (prohibiting criminal
acts that reflect adversely on the lawyer's honesty); id. DR 6-101(A)(3), DR 9-102(B)(1) and
Rule 1.4 (requiring the lawyer to deal honestly and directly with the client); id. DR 7-102, DR
7-107, and Rule 3.3 (requiring truthfulness to a tribunal); id. DR 7-102, DR 7-106, DR 7-
109, and Rule 3.4 (prohibiting falsification, obstruction or concealment of evidence); id. DR 7-
102(A)(5) and Rule 4.1 (requiring truthfulness in statements to third parties). See Lawyers
Manual on Professional Conduct, A.B.A.-B.N.A. § 101:401 (1986).
100. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Casety, 511 Pa. 177, 512 A.2d 607 (1986).
101. See, e.g., Matter of Goldberg, 105 N.J. 278, 520 A.2d 1147 (1987); People v.
Young, 732 P.2d 1208 (Colo. 1987); Cincinnati Bar Ass'n v. Levin, 3 Ohio St.3d 25, 445
N.E.2d 661 (1983); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Orosz, 5 Ohio St. 3d 204, 449 N.E.2d 1310
(1983).
102. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4) supra note 50.
103. 511 Pa. 177, 512 A.2d 607 (1986).
104. Id. at 184, 512 A.2d at 611.
105. All Pennsylvania lawyers are required to report convictions punishable by more
than one year to the Secretary of the Board within twenty days of sentencing. PA. R.D.E.
214(a) (1987).
106. Casety deceived the Administrative Office of the Pennsylvania Courts (AOPC)
about his active practice status in Pennsylvania by using a false business address in Pennsylva-
nia, having a friend pay the annual registration fee, and filing the AOPC's filing statements for
three years. Casety, 511 Pa. at 183, 512 A.2d at 610.
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lowered and the public would perceive the profession to have
been brought into disrepute." 7
Under the circumstances, the court concluded that Casety's post-
conviction conduct fell far below that expected of a lawyer."0
Conduct which is meant to deceive or misrepresent is equally
violative of Rule 8.4(c), the analogous provision of the Rules. 0 9 Al-
though the Rules will often be applied mainly in the context of a
lawyer's professional activities, they will also apply under this provi-
sion to areas beyond the scope of professional actions because the
conduct proscribed directly bears upon the lawyer's fitness to prac-
tice under Rule 8.4(b).
110
Violations under this provision more frequently have been found
when the lawyer's criminal conduct involves a conspiracy to engage
in cocaine-related activities. Presently, there are no reported cases in
Pennsylvania addressing the issue of conspiracy. But, the decisions of
the New Jersey Supreme Court are analogous."'
The New Jersey Supreme Court found a violation of both the
New Jersey Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 1-
102(a)(4) and the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
8.4(c) when a lawyer knowingly and intentionally joined and partici-
pated in a narcotics conspiracy. In Matter of Goldberg,12 the re-
spondent-lawyer played a significant role in a narcotics conspiracy,
counselled one of his clients on narcotics negotiations, was privy to
information regarding his client's continuing attempts to obtain co-
caine, and took steps to invest and shield the proceeds of his client's
narcotics transactions from detection.1 ' The court found that by vol-
untarily and knowingly participating in a conspiracy, Goldberg
failed to uphold the minimum standards of honesty, uprightness, and
fair dealing expected from a member of the bar.14 Here, the law-
yer's conduct was found to be even more egregious in the discipli-
nary context, because he used his professional license and legal skills
107. Id. at 185, 512 A.2d at 611.
108. Id.
109. Cf. PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4);
PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c) supra note 50; Weckstein, Maintaining
the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48 TEx. L. REv. 267 (1970).
110. See Lawyers Manual for Professional Conduct, A.B.A.-B.N.A. § 101:401 (1986).
111. See supra note 90.
112. 105 N.J. 278, 520 A.2d 1147 (1987).
113. Goldberg actually loaned a client his own driver's license so that the client could
copy various materials on the manufacturing of cocaine at a New York Library. Id. at 281,
520 A.2d at 1148.
114. Id. at 283, 520 A.2d at 1149-50.
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to violate the law. 115 This conduct was found to demonstrate his lack
of fitness to be a lawyer and his unsuitability to be entrusted with
the privileges and duties of the legal profession.118 The court con-
cluded that the crime, quite obviously, involved dishonesty, deceit,
and contempt for the law."
7
3. Conduct Prejudicial to Administration of Jus-
tice.-Conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice
forms the basis for the third ground under which a lawyer may be
disciplined for violating the misconduct provision. Like the provision
relating to dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation, Rule
8.4(d) of the Rules carries forward the same standard as promul-
gated in Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5) under the Code."' The pro-
scription against conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice has been criticized by some commentators as too broad in its
scope" and has been attacked as unconstitutionally broad and
vague.'20 The only Pennsylvania case dealing with a violation of this
rule in connection with cocaine-related activities, however, was not
challenged on that basis.
In In re Anonymous ("Anonymous Three"),' the court found
that the respondent-lawyer's conduct of engaging in various cocaine-
related activities violated Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5) of the Code
thereby warranting a one year suspension. The facts in this case re-
vealed that the respondent-lawyer purchased small amounts of co-
caine, used it in the presence of members of the public, consorted
openly with persons known to be cocaine dealers, and failed to take
any action against one dealer who showed the respondent 500
115. Id. at 282, 520 A.2d at 1149.
116. Id. at 283, 520 A.2d at 1150.
117. Id.
118. Cf. PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(5)
and PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(d), supra note 50.
119. Weckstein, Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal Profession, 48
TEX. L. REV. 267, 275-76 (1970); see also Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 57 NC. L. REV. 497, 502 n.13 (1979) (suggesting that DR 1-102(A)(5) is
insufficient to give fair notice to lawyers); American Bar Association, Code of Professional
Responsibility: Void for Vagueness 57 N.C. L. REV. 671, 684-85 (1979) (suggesting that DR
1-102(A)(5) leaves open the possibility that lawyers will be disciplined because of unorthodox
or politically unpopular conduct or views).
120. See, e.g., In re Keiler, 380 A.2d 119, 126 n.7 (D.C. 1977); In re Rook, 276 Or.
695, 705, 556 P.2d 1351, 1357 (1976) (DR 1-102(A)(5) upheld against attacks of unconstitu-
tional vagueness and overbreadth). Cf. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Campbell, 463 Pa.
472, 483-84, 345 A.2d 616, 621-22 (1975) (1976) (DR 1-102(A)(5) arguably vague but clear
as applied to case at bar), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 926.
121. 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 187 (1984).
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pounds of marijuana.1 2 The respondent's conduct was found to be
detrimental to the interests of justice in that he failed to take action
to inform law enforcement officials about drug dealing activities and
tacitly condoned others' illegal conduct, permitting it to flourish un-
checked. 128 The court found that by using cocaine in the company of
strangers over a substantial period of time the lawyer showed no
concern for the disrespect of the law and law enforcement which he
exhibited.2 4
4. Other Misconduct.-The Code provides a final ground upon
which lawyers' drug-related activities may be found to violate the
misconduct provision. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6) provides that a
lawyer shall not "engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law.' 125 This Disciplinary Rule is not con-
tinued in the Model Rules because of the rationale that the miscon-
duct to which it is directed is proscribed more narrowly by specific
provisions in the Model Rules.' 26 In Pennsylvania, Disciplinary Rule
1-102(a)(6) has been applied to lawyers convicted of cocaine-related
offenses. 27 Since such violations are crimes, they would also fall
within Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules. 28
B. Reporting Requirement - The Undisciplined Scope of Profes-
sional Conduct
A separate ground upon which lawyers may be disciplined for
cocaine related activities occurs through the failure to report miscon-
duct of their fellow lawyers. This issue creates particular problems
with respect to enforcement because within the legal profession lies a
122. Id. at 188-89.
123. Id. at 190.
124. Id. at 189.
125. Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(6) supra note 50.
126. See Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct, A.B.A.-B.N.A. § 101:1001 (1987).
Applications of DR 1-102(A)(6) have frequently involved conduct specifically proscribed by
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Commission v. Silk,
279 Md. 345, 369 A.2d 70 (1977) (Embezzlement, Rule 8.4(b)); Office of Disciplinary Coun-
sel v. Campbell, 463 Pa. 472, 345 A.2d 616 (1975) (receipt of money to arrange for destruc-
tion of evidence, Rules 3.3, 3.4 and 8.4(e)); Annotation, Validity and Application of Regula-
tion Requiring Suspension or Disbarment of Attorney Because of Mental or Emotional
Illness, 50 A.L.R.3d 125 (1970) (suspension or disbarment of attorneys for physical or mental
disability, Rule 1.16(a)(2)).
127. See, e.g., In re Anonymous ("Anonymous Three"), 33 Pa. D. & C.3d 187 (1984),
In re Anonymous ("Anonymous Two"), 35 Pa. D. & C. 3d 160 (1984). For cases in other
jurisdictions, see, In re Preston, 616 P.2d I (Alaska 1980); Matter of Thomas, 420 N.E.2d
1237 (Ind. 1981); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Ass'n v. Matt, 213 Neb. 123, 327 N.W.2d
622 (1982).
128. See Rule 8.4(b), supra note 50.
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deeply rooted devotion to loyalty, confidentiality, and secrecy.' 29
Nevertheless, the legal profession unequivocally obligates lawyers to
report the misconduct of their fellow lawyers. Likewise, one of the
basic tenets of both the Code and the Rules in Pennsylvania contin-
ues to require such a duty.'3 0
Under the Code, Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) imposes a broad
duty on lawyers to report all "unprivileged knowledge of a violation
of a Disciplinary Rule to a tribunal or other authority empowered to
investigate or act upon such violation." " ' This rule rigidly requires
lawyers to report all violations of misconduct that would fall under
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A).' Because Disciplinary Rule 1-
102(A)(1) forbids a violation of any Disciplinary Rule, the reporting
requirement applies to all ethical violations.133 The Rules, in com-
parison, alter the strict requirements of the Code.
34
Rule 8.3(a) requires "[a] lawyer having knowledge that another
lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Con-
duct" to report the violation to the appropriate professional authority
only if it "raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.' 3 5 The re-
porting requirement under the Rules is more flexible than that under
the Code because it allows the lawyer to judge the seriousness of the
misconduct before the obligation to report arises.'3 6 The commentary
129. See Drugs, supra note 5, at 10. In a professional responsibility treatise, the authors
maintained that "it is probably no exaggeration to say that the public defines lawyers as 'those
who keep secrets' as much as it considers them to be 'those who litigate cases' or 'those who
draft documents.'" G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
THE MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 89 (1985). Generally lawyers have a distaste
for "policing" one another because too often reporting the malfeasance of a professional col-
league is characterized as being a "rat fink" a "whistle blower," a "tattle tale," or a
"squealer." See also Discipline, supra note 8, at 61; American Bar Association Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, In Defense of Mediocracy, 6 TRIAL Aug./Sept. 1970 at 29, 30.
130. See Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) and Rule 8.3(a) supra note 51.
131. Disciplinary Rule 1-103(A) supra note 51.
132. Two articles that address the reporting provision note that Disciplinary Rule I-
103(A) is on its face a requirement that lawyers report to the legal authorities any un-
privileged knowledge of another attorney's violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102. Note, The
Lawyer's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 509, 510 (1978) [herein-
after Duty to Report]; Lynch, Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 506 n.59 [hereinafter
Lynch].
133. Failure to make a report violates DR 1-103(A) and thereby violates DR I-
102(A)(l) which states that "[a] lawyer shall not violate a Disciplinary Rule." Disciplinary
Rule 1-102(A)(1) supra note 50.
134. Although the requirement to report has not been deleted from the Pennsylvania
Rules, it imposes a less restrictive obligation to report and focuses directly on how the act in
question bears on the lawyers professional relationships. See infra notes 135-37 and accompa-
nying text.
135. Rule 8.3(a) supra note 51.
136. The commentary following Rule 8.3(a) acknowledges that compliance requires a
measure of judgment that the conduct be substantial before the obligation to inform arises.
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following Rule 8.3 notes that this rule limits the reporting obligation
to those offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously en-
deavor to prevent. It also notes that the term "substantial" refers to
the seriousness of the possible offense and not the quantum of evi-
dence of which the lawyer is aware."' 7
Under both the Code and the Rules, however, any uncertainty
about whether a violation has actually occurred removes the obliga-
tion to report.' 8  Neither the Code nor the Rules require lawyers to
report information suggesting that a violation may have occurred.
The duty to report arises only if the lawyer has actual "knowledge"
of a violation. 39 Actual knowledge under the code presumably ap-
plies to both factual knowledge as to whether a fellow lawyer had
engaged in the particular misconduct in question and legal knowl-
edge as to whether such conduct violated a Disciplinary Rule.14 The
Rules, in contrast, set a high standard of factual knowledge, but may
not require knowledge of the legal effect of the known facts."' The
following hypothetical situation involving two lawyers, Partner and
Associate, demonstrates the application of the reporting requirement
under the Code and the Rules.
During a social gathering, Partner and Associate discuss their
individual plans for the upcoming holiday. Associate tells Partner
that it would be nice if he received his weekly shipment of cocaine a
little early because with the holiday vacation coming up it would sell
fast and he could make enough money to take his wife on the vaca-
tion that he had promised. Associate indicates that he doubts that he
will receive the shipment early and, therefore, there is probably no
The term substantial refers to the seriousness of the evidence of which the lawyer is aware. PA.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3(a) comment (1988).
137. Id.
138. A comparison of DR 1-103(A) with DR 1-103(B), which requires revelation of
"knowledge or evidence upon proper request of a [disciplinary] tribunal," implies that "knowl-
edge of a violation" does not mean "evidence of a violation." Thus "evidence" is to be supplied
on request, but only knowledge is to be reported sua sponte. Lynch, supra note 132, at 506
n.60. The Rules state that "knowledge" denotes only "actual knowledge." PA. RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1988).
139. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
140. The term "knowledge" is not defined in the Code; however, the definitions of
knowledge used in the criminal context provide a useful analogy in determining its meaning.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1974) (knowledge can be established if a person is
aware of a high probability of [a fact], unless he actually believes that it does not exist);
United States v. Cano, 702 F.2d 370, 371-72 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming conviction for know-
ingly and intentionally importing and possessing cocaine based on charge that jury might find
the requisite knowledge if they found that the defendant "was aware of a high probability that
the envelopes contained drugs."); see also Lynch, supra note 132, at 508; Duty to Report,
supra note 132, at 510-11 n. 13.
141. The Rules define knowledge as "actual knowledge of the facts in question." PA.
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Terminology (1988).
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chance of going on vacation. Partner offers to lend Associate the
money for the trip. Associate replies, "No, I could never borrow
money from a friend. Maybe I'll just borrow a couple thousand dol-
lars from my client's trust fund."
In this situation, Partner has obtained information suggesting
that Associate has committed a criminal offense in the past and is
likely to commit both criminal and professional violations in the fu-
ture. While Partner is free to report the misconduct that has been
brought to his attention, he does not violate the Code if he fails to do
So. 142 Assuming that Partner believes the distribution of cocaine vio-
lates a disciplinary rule, he still lacks the knowledge that Associate
has committed the crime in question.
The inquiry under the Rules, however, is different. When the
misconduct occurs outside the lawyer's professional role, the duty to
report under the Rules becomes much more problematic. Although
Associate's conduct would appear to reflect adversely on his honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer, such a violation does not im-
mediately trigger the duty to report. 143 The Rules only require Part-
ner to report Associate's violations if, in his judgment, the crime is
serious and raises a substantial question as to Associate's fitness as a
lawyer.144 With respect to drug use, the Rules provide no guidance
in answering this question. The comment following Rule 8.4 states
that the rule does not cover "offenses concerning some matters of
personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses.' ' 5 The
distribution of cocaine could arguably fall inside or outside this cate-
gory. Although some attorneys find all lawyer involvement with ille-
gal drugs to be intolerable, there is no doubt that some attorneys
believe that offenses involving certain drugs are matters of personal
morality only.146
142. See, e.g., A.B.A. Commission on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 1203 (1976)
(where a senior partner instructed a junior partner to withhold certain information from the
court. The junior partner sought the advice of the A.B.A. Committee on Professional Ethics on
whether he should report the senior partner to a disciplinary body. The committee advised that
he should withdraw from the case and not report the senior partner because the report would
be premature. The committee added that if the junior partner received knowledge that a disci-
plinary rule was violated, then a report should be made.).
143. PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 presumably requires the same fac-
tual knowledge that is required under the PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Disciplinary
Rule 1-103(A). Therefore, on the basis of the information provided, it would not be found that
Partner has "knowledge" of a violation of Rule 8.4(b). See supra notes 140-42; Lynch, supra
note 132, at 513.
144. Rule 8.3(a) supra note 51.
145. PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 comment (1988).
146. See, e.g., Drugs, supra note 5, at 10; Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 511 (Alaska
1975) (court determined that possession of marijuana by adults in home was protected under
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Misguided loyalty may also deter Partner from reporting Asso-
ciate's cocaine-related activities." 7 Not all lawyers strive to uncover
the truth at the expense of abandoning other social values. Cur-
rently, there is little incentive to bring another lawyer's misconduct
to the attention of the disciplinary authorities." 8 It is likely that
most lawyers believe that their fellow lawyers would think less of
them if they did inform." 9 Although many lawyers strive to comply
with all of the mandates of the profession's rules of conduct, the
overall reaction to the broad reporting requirement has been consis-
tent ambivalence.1 50 In this respect, the degree of enforcement of
this obligation has also been negligible. 151
The mandate of the reporting provision appears more theoreti-
cal than real. There are very few reported cases in which discipline
has been imposed for a lawyer's failure to report another lawyer's
misconduct. 2 Two cases unrelated to drug offenses, however, have
imposed sanctions for violations of this rule. In Attorney Grievance
Commission v. Kann, 53 an associate lawyer was disbarred for acqui-
escing in and participating in the practice of making cash payments
to runners for bringing potential clients to his employer's law office.
The lawyer explained that he continued in this practice because he
was unable to find other employment. The court found that explana-
tion unacceptable and concluded that the lawyer's continued associa-
tion with his employer, after becoming aware of the practice, and his
failure to report his knowledge to any authority violated Disciplinary
Rule 1-103(A).'" Likewise, in Carter v. Falcarelli,55 the court
state constitutional right to privacy).
147. "A lawyer who sins is generally somebody's friend who is basically a good guy who
has gone bad temporarily." Discipline, supra note 8, at 60.
148. See Lawyers Who are Felons, NAT'L. L.J. Nov. 9, 1987, at 36. (Attorney General
John Van de Kamp of California, in an inquiry about criminal referrals, stated that "many
prosecutors don't know they are suppose to report to the bar. And, frankly others don't think it
will do any good.")
149. One commentator notes that the act of informing "seems contrary to the nature of
most of us." Thode, The Duty of Lawyers and Judges to Report Other Lawyers' Breaches of
the Standards of the Legal Profession, 1976 UTAH L. REV. 95, 100 [hereinafter Thodel.
150. There is a considerable amount of commentary indicating that lawyers are simply
ignoring the rules by failing to report unethical conduct. See, Burbank and Deboff, Ethics and
the Legal Profession: A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 66, 100-01 (1974)
[hereinafter Burbank and Duboff]; Thode, supra note 149, at 99; Duty to Report, supra note
132, at 512 n. 23, 515-17; Lynch, supra note 132, at 516.
151. Aside from the enforcement of the anticompetitive rules, few cases focus on the
ethical responsibility of a lawyer regarding another lawyer. Burbank and Duboff, supra note
150, at 70. "The conclusion one draws from looking at (or looking for) cases on ethics is that
the dirty laundry of the legal profession is hung privately if at all." Id. at 70-71.
152. See Lawyers Manual on Professional Conduct, A.B.A.-B.N.A. § 101:202 (1984).
153. 290 Md. 654, 431 A.2d 1336 (1981).
154. Id. at 664, 431 A.2d at 1342.
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found a violation of the reporting provision where a lawyer failed to
divulge the identity of a lawyer to whom matters had been for-
warded and subsequently neglected. In this case, the court imposed a
less restrictive sanction of public censure.156
At the present time there have been no reported cases in Penn-
sylvania in which discipline has been imposed against a lawyer for
failure to report another lawyer's involvement with illegal drugs.
157
This does not mean, however, that lawyers with such knowledge are
exempt from the ethical obligation to disclose such violations. 58
Consequently, the profession's ambiguous endorsement of the report-
ing requirement continues to be a critical issue.
III. The Impaired Lawyers Program
Drug impairment is no defense in a disciplinary proceeding.1
5 9
If the misconduct is not too serious, however, it may mitigate the
sanctions imposed.' 60 Pennsylvania allows the bar association to
place a drug impaired lawyer on inactive or disability status pending
his recovery.' 6' Until recently, however, the legal profession's efforts
to assist lawyers impaired by drugs were quite negligible." 2 As long
as a lawyer's use of drugs was discreet and his performance ade-
quate, his peers were not likely to question the impropriety of his
conduct. 63 Removal of a lawyer from the pressures of the profession
was recognized as the most workable solution once the organized bar
recognized that drug impairment was a curable problem. 6 4 Placing
the treatment of an impaired lawyer within the context of the profes-
sional disciplinary mechanism, however, was considered to be an in-
155. 402 A.2d 1175 (R.I. 1979).
156. Id. at 1179. In this case the court held that the respondent lawyer violated DR I-
103(B), which is identical to the PA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary
Rule 1-103(B) supra note 51.
157. But see Casety, supra note 100 (where court found that lawyer's deliberate failure
to report his own conviction constituted a violation of DR 1-103(A)).
158. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
159. See Out of Control, supra note 26, at 18.
160. See, e.g., In re Vaugh, 38 Cal.3d 614, 698 P.2d 651, 213 Cal. Rptr. 583 (1985)
(lawyer offered his drug dependency in mitigation of his misconduct); Florida Bar v. Barlett,
509 So.2d 287 (Fla. 1987) (addicted attorney's positive efforts to free himself from his addic-
tion should be considered as mitigating circumstances when determining appropriate disci-
pline); Florida Bar v. Rosen, 495 So.2d 180 (Fla. 1986) (loss of control due to addiction may
properly be considered as mitigating circumstances).
161. See Out of Control, supra note 26, at 18.
162. Id. at 17.
163. Id.
164. Removing an attorney from the pressures of his profession can help him focus on
regaining health and sanity. Id. at 18.
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effective solution to the problem.'65
To prevent lawyers from committing ethical violations associ-
ated with illegal drugs, many states have implemented intervention
programs to assist lawyers in recovering from their addictions with-
out the threat of the imposition of discipline. 6 ' Pennsylvania re-
cently approved an impaired-lawyer intervention program of its
own.167 The purpose of the program is to assist lawyers with alcohol
or drug dependencies in regaining their health and professional com-
petence. The program uses trained intervenors to encourage the im-
paired lawyer to seek appropriate treatment. The foundation of the
program guarantees confidentiality which serves to distance mem-
bers of the program from the state disciplinary board. 68
The implementation of Pennsylvania's intervention program,
however, creates a potential conflict with a lawyer's obligation to re-
port misconduct. There is a high degree of probability that when an
impaired lawyer seeks rehabilitation he will disclose information re-
garding violations of the Rules. 69 For the intervention program to be
effective, it is essential that members of the program be given protec-
tion that they will not be subjected to disciplinary action for their
failure to report information regarding cocaine-related offenses of
their peers.'7 Presently, Pennsylvania lawyers place their licenses in
jeopardy by not reporting such violations. Therefore, an effort to
amend this rule is essential.
An exception to the reporting requirement would exempt mem-
bers of the intervention program from the obligation to report poten-
tial ethical violations disclosed by lawyers during the time of their
rehabilitation and would insure that such information would not be
revealed to disciplinary authorities.' Other jurisdictions have
amended or modified their reporting provisions to provide for this
165. Id. One of the greatest fears of those that might be helped is the possibility that
once contact is made the disciplinary agency will be notified. S.C. Acts to Shield Impaired
Lawyer Data, BAR LEADER, Jan./Feb. 1987, at I I [hereinafter BAR LEADER].
166. According to a 1983 survey, 37 state bars had drug-abuse and alcohol-abuse pro-
grams, Directory of Bar Activities, A.B.A. DIVISION BAR SERVICES (1983). Three states have
developed programs since then. See BAR LEADER, supra note 165, at 1I.
167. Recently, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Alcohol and Drug Ad-
diction approved a proposal to establish a "Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers" program. See
Out of Control, supra note 26, at 18.
168. Several programs geared toward assisting impaired lawyers stress the need for con-
fidential intervention. See Out of Control, supra note 26, at 18; Substance Abuse, supra note
28, at 9; Legal Response, supra note 23, at 51.
169. See BAR LEADER, supra note 165, at 11.
170. Id.
171. See A.B.A. Center for Professional Responsibility Survey: Impaired Lawyer Pro-
grams (1982) (on file at the A.B.A. Center for Professional Responsibility).
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exception.1 7 2 Pennsylvania should follow the lead of these jurisdic-
tions by adopting one of the following two approaches.
The first approach would amend the present professional con-
duct rules regarding the confidentiality of information.1 7 1 In Pennsyl-
vania, rules governing the confidentiality of information are promul-
gated in Rule 1.6. The provision governs a lawyer's ethical
obligation to maintain confidential information conveyed by a client.
This rule could be amended to apply the same confidentiality re-
quirement to information obtained from fellow lawyers. The amend-
ment would explicitly provide that the attorney-client privilege under
the applicable law relates only to communications between the
trained intervenor and the lawyer participating in the designated
program. One suggestion is for the amendment to provide that the
relationship between a trained intervenor and lawyer who seeks reha-
bilitation should be privileged in the same manner as that of an at-
torney and client for purpose of the application of the misconduct
provision.
The second approach modifies the existing reporting provi-
sion. 7 5 Rule 8.3(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules requires lawyers to
inform "the appropriate professional authority" of violations of the
Rules. 17" An alternative to the first approach would be to modify
Rule 8.3(a) to encompass the impaired-lawyer intervention program
as an "appropriate professional authority" to which information
must be reported. The modification could be provided for in the com-
ment section accompanying Rule 8.3 and could explain that, for the
purpose of misconduct regarding drug related offenses, the interven-
172. Bar Associations in various states that have attempted to help impaired lawyers
have reconciled the conflict presented by the obligation to report by amended ethics codes and
advisory opinions. See OR. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 and N.H. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.3 which have modified Rule 8.3 to address impaired lawyers
committees; Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York Bar Association, Opinion No.
531 (April 28, 1981) which permits committee members to refrain from reporting what they
have learned of professional misconduct; and ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Disciplinary Rule 4-101 which provides an exception to the conduct rules regarding confidenti-
ality of information.
173. This approach has been followed in Illinois. See ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(f) (1984) which provides:
(f) The relationship of trained intervenor and a lawyer or a judge who seeks
or receives assistance through the Lawyers' Assistance Program, Inc., shall be
the same as that of attorney client for purposes of the application of Rules I-
103, 4-101 and 7-102(b).
174. See PA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1988).
175. See Comm. on Professional Ethics of the New York Bar Association, Opinion No.
531 (April 28, 1981) (where committee construed "other authority empowered to investigate
or act" as encompassing the rehabilitation committee obviating a member's duty to report).
176. See Rule 8.3(a), supra note 51.
92 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW SPRING 1988
tion programs are to be considered appropriate professional
authorities.
The current reporting requirement in Pennsylvania is not a pro-
ductive rule for preventing lawyers from committing ethical viola-
tions associated with illegal drugs. Because lawyers know that using
cocaine is against the law, an important concern among lawyers is
how to get help without letting the disciplinary board know that they
have a problem." Any of the foregoing suggestions for change could
be adopted by Pennsylvania and implemented through the applica-
tion of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
IV. Conclusion
Lawyers who engage in illegal drug activities present substantial
problems for the legal profession. Their use of illegal drugs and their
involvement in lucrative drug transactions pose serious threats to the
public's confidence in the profession and create serious ethical ques-
tions as to their fitness to remain in the profession. Since the major-
ity of lawyers' illegal drug activities occur outside of their profes-
sional roles, the problems become far more complicated.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's adoption of the
Rules of Professional Conduct was an attempt to build the public's
confidence in the legal profession, in reality the Rules perpetuate
lawyers' non-professional illegal drug activities. Because the Rules
will be applied mainly within the context of a lawyer's professional
activities, the Rules theoretically will not be applied to situations in
which a lawyer's illegal drug activity is wholly unrelated to their
ability to practice law. In this respect Pennsylvania's adoption of the
more flexible Rules of Professional Conduct will be an impediment
to an effective solution to this pervasive problem. As a result, the
public may witness an increasing number of lawyers who are lawyers
by day but drug users by night.
Melinda A. Rishkofski
177. See Cocaine Blues, supra note 25, at 25.
